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Commentary on Burton v. State
GREER DONLEY*
Abstract:
In March of 2009, Samantha Burton went into labor only 25 weeks into her pregnancy.
This is a very serious pregnancy complication that not only risks the pregnant woman’s health, but
also greatly reduces her potential child’s chance of survival despite the most aggressive care. Ms.
Burton’s doctor prescribed, among other things, inpatient bed rest for the duration of her pregnancy,
which would have required her to be separated from her two minor children at home. Ms. Burton
found that recommendation unacceptable, and as a competent adult, asked to be discharged or to
obtain a second opinion from another hospital. Instead of abiding by Ms. Burton’s request, a court
order was obtained that required Ms. Burton to submit to any and all care the doctor believed was
“necessary to preserve the life and health of [Ms. Burton’s] unborn child.” Ms. Burton was
eventually coerced into a cesarean section, during which the doctor discovered that her child had
already died in utero.
Ms. Burton’s case is tragic—she not only endured the trauma of losing her child, but the
state’s invasion into her basic autonomy. On appeal, the court overruled the decision, finding that
the trial court had used the wrong legal standard in compelling Ms. Burton’s care. As part of the
Feminist Judgment Series, Nadia Sawicki adds a vital concurrence to that appellate decision, which
would have also overturned the trial court’s decision as unsupported by substantial evidence. Her
contribution highlights the need to hold lower courts accountable for avoidable evidentiary errors
in addition to legal ones. This commentary provides additional support and context to explain why
the trial court’s evidentiary missteps are so important to correct.

***This is a draft of my forthcoming chapter in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN
HEALTH LAW OPINIONS (Seema Mohapatra and Lindsay F. Wiley, eds.) (Cambridge
University Press, expected publication 2021). Feedback is welcome.***

*

Greer Donley is an Assistant Professor at the University of Pittsburgh Law School. I would like to thank Lindsay
Wiley and Seema Mohapatra for their incredible support and wonderful feedback throughout the writing process. I
would also like to thank Nadia Sawicki for an effortless and fruitful collaboration. I dedicate this commentary to my
Raziel—a good work in your name.
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I.

Background

In Burton v. State, Samantha Burton appealed a Florida trial court’s Order Authorizing
Medical Treatment that compelled her to submit to any “medical care and treatment” that a doctor
believed was “necessary to preserve the life and health of [Ms. Burton’s] unborn child.”1 This
included “restricting Samantha Burton to bed rest, administering appropriate medication,
postponing labor, taking appropriate steps to prevent and/or treat infection, and/or eventually
performing a caesarian section delivery of the child at the appropriate time.”2 The order also denied
Ms. Burton’s request to seek care at a different hospital—and presumably, with a different
doctor—as it was “not in the child’s best interest at this time.”3 The order was not time-limited
and was expected to stay in place until after her potential child4 was born.5
As Sawicki’s concurrence highlights, Ms. Burton’s story is completely absent from both
the trial court’s order and the appellate court’s opinion. This omission is reprehensible. Though
our information is limited, we know that at twenty-five weeks pregnant, Ms. Burton started
experiencing complications: her water broke and contractions began. 6 It is worth noting the
seriousness of this complication at twenty-five weeks into a pregnancy. A twenty-five-week-old
fetus is at the “limit of viability.”7 Around the time of Ms. Burton’s diagnosis, roughly half of
these extremely premature babies (56%) would die in utero, during labor, or in the hospital before
discharge,8 although the survival statistics have improved over the past decade.9 The lucky babies
that survived typically required an average of three and a half months in the NICU.10 And at least
a quarter of the surviving children would have experienced serious disability throughout their life,
including cerebral palsy, blindness, profound hearing loss, or serious intellectual and
1

Order Authorizing Medical Treatment at 2, No. 2009CA1167 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 2009) [Hereinafter Order].
Id. at 3.
3
Id.
4
As Sawicki notes in footnote 3 of her concurrence, it is very difficult to choose a neutral word to refer to the
subject of Ms. Burton’s pregnancy. In the context of an unwanted pregnancy, especially if that pregnancy is
terminated, reproductive rights advocates unequivocally use the word “fetus” for a variety of important reasons. But
Ms. Burton’s pregnancy was desired—or, at least, there is no reason to think the pregnancy was unwanted. In
desired pregnancies, women often see their fetus as a baby, and in the case of stillbirth, mourn the baby’s death as a
child. For that reason, I sought to avoid the term “fetus” as much as possible, which to me suggests a maternal-fetal
conflict that I don’t believe exists here. However, I respect the rationale behind Sawicki’s terminology, and agree
that regardless of the chosen term, the word is incredibly loaded.
5
Order at 2-3.
6
Id. at 2; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) [Hereinafter
Burton Brief]; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 1, Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
[Hereinafter State Brief].
7
AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS, https://www.acog.org//media/Obstetric-Care-Consensus-Series/occ006.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20180129T0128313960.
8
See Nicholas S. Wood et al., Neurologic and Developmental Disability After Extremely Preterm Birth, 343 NEW
ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 378, 379 (2000). Of course, survival rates are greatly influenced by the quality of the hospital
and the technological advances of the time period. I attempted to use data that would capture what doctors knew and
were conveying to their patients in 2009.
9
More recent estimates suggest higher survival statistics, but still show that a quarter to a third of babies born before
26 weeks will not survive. AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 7 at e188.
10
Sarah E. Seaton et al., Estimating Neonatal Length Of Stay For Babies Born Very Preterm, 104 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD - FETAL AND NEONATAL EDITION F182, F184 (2019 (“Babies born at 24 and 25 weeks of
gestational age who survive to discharge have the longest median length of stay, staying around 123 and 107 days,
respectively.”).
2

2

developmental delays.11 When you combine disability and mortality statistics at the time, only 23%
of babies born alive at 25 weeks would have been alive without a significant disability at 30 months
old.12
Though additional weeks in the womb would have offered the potential child a better
prognosis, frequently labor cannot be stopped for more than a few days. Bed rest, for instance, is
now believed to be ineffective at helping almost all pregnancy complications.13 And even for
women like Ms. Burton with preterm premature rupture of membranes (PPROM), there is no
evidence that bed rest improves maternal or fetal outcomes or significantly delays labor. 14
Unfortunately, the median latency period from rupture to birth before twenty-six weeks is only
four to eight days.15 One reason for this is that once the membranes have ruptured, doctors must
balance the desire to delay labor with the risk of infection that can severely harm both the mother
and her child.16 The longer delivery is delayed, the higher the risk of infection, and thus, the higher
the risk of maternal morbidity and mortality.17
In other words, once Ms. Burton’s water broke at twenty-five weeks, there was no simple
solution to save Ms. Burton’s child, and aggressive intervention risked her health. Ms. Burton’s
child faced a dire prognosis no matter how aggressively the doctors treated her. When serious
11

AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 7 at e188.
Wood et al., supra note 8 at 379.
13
See e.g., Bed Rest During Pregnancy: Get the Facts, MAYO CLINIC (March 31, 2017),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/pregnancy/art-20048007 (“Bed rest
during pregnancy is no longer recommended for most conditions.”); Cristina McCall, David Grimes & Anne
Drapkin Lyerly, "Therapeutic" Bed Rest in Pregnancy: Unethical and Unsupported by Data, 121 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1305 (2013) (Exploring “[s]ix Cochrane systematic reviews of bed rest in pregnancy,” finding that
they “do not support [bed rest as treatment for various conditions],” and concluding that “[b]ecause ‘therapeutic’ bed
rest has no known benefit yet established harms, its continued use is inconsistent with the ethical principles that
govern medical practice.”); Catherine Bigelow & Joanne Stone, Bed Rest in Pregnancy, 78 MOUNT SINAI JOURNAL
OF MEDICINE 291 (2011) (“Bed rest is prescribed for a variety of complications of pregnancy, from threatened
abortion and multiple gestations to preeclampsia and preterm labor. Although the use of bed rest is pervasive, there
is a paucity of data to support its use.”).
14
See e.g., Catherine Bigelow et al., 780: Pilot Randomized Clinical Trial To Evaluate The Impact of Bed Rest On
Maternal And Fetal Outcomes In Women With Preterm Premature Rupture of Membranes (PPROM), 212 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY S378 (2015) (“There were no statistically significant differences in maternal and
fetal outcomes after FDR correction.”); Nathan Fox et al., The Recommendation For Bed Rest In The Setting Of
Arrested Preterm Labor And Premature Rupture Of Membranes, 200 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 165.e1
(2009).
15
See Julie E. Robertson et al., Fetal, Infant and Maternal Outcomes among Women with Prolapsed Membranes
Admitted before 29 Weeks Gestation, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2016); Elsa Lorthe, et al., Preterm Premature Rupture Of
Membranes At 22e25 Weeks’ Gestation: Perinatal And 2-Year Outcomes Within A National Population-Based Study
(EPIPAGE-2), 219 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 298.e1, 298.e4 (2018). Later in the pregnancy, latency to
birth can be extended to almost two weeks with active management. Mara J. Dinsmoor, Outcomes After Expectant
Management of Extremely Preterm Premature Rupture of The Membranes, 190 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 183 (2004).
16
Dinsmoor, supra note 15 at 31 (Noting that “PPROM management has two main goals: reducing fetal immaturity
at birth and avoiding chorioamnionitis” and “[e]xtension of the latency period nonetheless exposes the fetus to
complications such as chorioamnionitis, retroplacental hematoma and fetal distress.”).
17
AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 7 at e191 (“Maternal morbidity and mortality may
arise not just with interventions surrounding periviable pregnancy management but also with decisions not to
intervene. For example, decisions to delay delivery (so-called “expectant management”) in the setting of preterm
premature rupture of membranes (PROM) may result in maternal infection . . .”).
12
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health complications arise in a desired pregnancy, women are faced with some of the most difficult
decisions of their lives. In these tragic situations, doctors should strive to support patient autonomy,
not create additional trauma by stripping patients of their rights. The American College of
Obstetrics & Gynecology (ACOG), for instance, has long urged doctors to “present the option of
nonintervention” as a reasonable choice before twenty-six weeks.18 And after adequate counseling,
doctors should respect whatever choice is made. Accordingly, the American Academy of
Pediatrics has said:
When the fetus’ prognosis is uncertain, decisions regarding obstetric
management must be made by the parents and their physicians . . . .
Counseling may result in the family choosing not to have active
intervention for the delivery and care of the infant. Because the
relative benefits of different types of obstetric management are not
always known, families should be supported in these often difficult
and sometimes controversial decisions.19
It is with this background in mind that we review what is known of Ms. Burton’s story.
After voluntarily presenting at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, Ms. Burton was examined by Dr.
Bures-Forsthoefel.20 We must assume that Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel explained the seriousness of her
situation before recommending that Ms. Burton remain on bedrest at the hospital and immediately
quit smoking to give her child the best (albeit not promising) chance at life.21 Forced bedrest at the
hospital would have required Ms. Burton to be separated from her two children for the duration of
her pregnancy—potentially months—which she found unacceptable. 22 As a rational and
competent adult, Ms. Burton refused to follow Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel’s orders and asked to be
discharged.23
Instead of allowing Ms. Burton to leave, the hospital involved the state attorney general’s
office, which inserted itself into this private medical decision.24 After litigation ensued, Ms. Burton
requested transfer to another hospital, in all likelihood to obtain a second opinion from other
doctors.25 Of course, many responsible mothers would seek a second opinion for such an important
medical decision—the life and health of her child and herself were on the line. Yet the court denied
this request, and Ms. Burton’s rights with it, under the false assumption that “a change is not in
18

ACOG, Periviable Birth: Interim Update, 215 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY B2, B6 (2016); see also
ACOG Practice Bulletin, Perinatal care at the threshold of viability, 79 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 181
(2002).
19
Hugh MacDonald, Perinatal Care at The Threshold of Viability, 110 PEDIATRICS 1024, 1025-26 (2002); see also
Karen Kavanaugh et al., Supporting Parents’ Decision Making Surrounding the Anticipated Birth of Extremely
Premature Infant, 23 J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING 159 (2009).
20
Burton Brief at 1.
21
Id. at 1; State Brief at 1.
22
Id. at 2; Brief for ACLU at 7, Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) [Hereinafter ACLU Brief].
23
Burton Brief at 1; State Brief at 1.
24
In Florida, “a health care provider wishing to override a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment must
immediately provide notice to the State Attorney presiding in the circuit where the controversy arises, and to
interested third parties known to the health care provider. The extent to which the State Attorney chooses to engage
in a legal action, if any, is discretionary based on the law and facts of each case.” State Brief at 19-20 (quoting In Re
Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 824 (Fla. 1993)).
25
Sawicki Concurrence at 5.
4

the child’s best interest at the time.”26 Instead, the court compelled Ms. Burton to submit to any
treatment Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel recommended “to preserve the life and health of [her] unborn
child,” ignoring Ms. Burton’s interests entirely.27 The result was that Ms. Burton was forced to
follow medical recommendations that we know in retrospect were both ineffective and outside of
the standard of care. In the process, she was stripped of her right to make healthcare decisions for
herself and end-of-life decisions for her child. A second medical opinion could have revealed Dr.
Bures-Forsthoefel’s errors and biases. But more importantly, it would have allowed Ms. Burton to
exercise autonomy over her medical decisions amidst a devastating situation.
Unfortunately, this terrible story has a worse ending. After days of forced treatment,
confinement, and separation from her two living children, “doctors performed an emergency
cesarean section on Ms. Burton and discovered that her fetus had already died in utero.”28 In other
words, the deprivation of Ms. Burton’s right to bodily autonomy did not protect her child, and Ms.
Burton was still left a grieving mother of a stillborn baby. This reality is shockingly absent from
the case history, which remarkably paints Ms. Burton as the villain, not the victim, of a profound
loss. Without question, the loss of her child was compounded by the trauma of compelled, futile
medical treatment.
Once the trial court learned that Ms. Burton was no longer pregnant, it lifted the Order
Authorizing Medical Treatment. 29 Nevertheless, Ms. Burton bravely appealed the trial court’s
prior order even though it had dissolved. And she won. All three appellate judges agreed that the
district court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the state’s infringement of Ms.
Burton’s rights30 (although one of them would have dismissed the appeal on mootness grounds).31
II.

Original Opinion

The first issue before the appellate court was mootness. Judge Clark, writing for the court,
held that the case was not moot because the issue was “capable of repetition yet evading review.”32
The court next examined the substantive issue of whether the trial court had applied the correct
legal standard in evaluating whether to compel medical treatment on a competent adult. Judge
Clark found that the standard applied by the trial court—best interest of the child (BIC)—was
incorrect.33 The court rightly noted that the BIC standard applies only when the state seeks to
compel treatment for children over the objections of physically independent parents.34 It does not,
however, apply when the state seeks to compel treatment for developing fetuses over a mother’s
objection, which would necessarily infringe on her right to privacy and bodily autonomy.35

26

Order at 3.
Burton Brief at 1.
28
ACLU Brief at 2.
29
Burton Brief at 2; State Brief at 2.
30
Burton v. State, 49 So.3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (Clark, J.) (Van Nortwick, J., concurring) (Berger, J.
dissenting).
31
Id. (Berger, J. dissenting).
32
Id. at 264 (citing, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
33
Id. at 265.
34
Id. at 266.
35
Id.
27
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Instead, the court held that the proper test for evaluating compelled treatment in pregnancy
has three parts. First, the trial court must make a finding of fetal viability: “Only after the threshold
determination of viability has been made may the court weigh the state’s compelling interest to
preserve the life of the fetus against the patient’s fundamental constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment.”36 Second, the trial court must determine whether “the state’s compelling state interest
is sufficient to override the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to protect her person, including
her right to refuse medical treatment.” 37 Third and finally, “the state must then show that the
method for pursuing that compelling state interest is ‘narrowly tailored in the least intrusive
manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual.’”38 This legal standard is much more
protective of pregnant women.
Judge Van Nortwick agreed with Judge Clark’s opinion, but wrote a separate concurrence
to add that he also believed Ms. Burton’s Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel was
violated.39 Even though this case involved a civil, not criminal, proceeding, Judge Van Nortwick
relied on the United States Supreme Court’s precedent finding that “an indigent litigant has a right
to appointed counsel only when, if [s]he loses, [s]he may be deprived of [her] physical liberty.”40
His concurrence argued that Ms. Burton was entitled to representation by counsel before being
“involuntarily admitted to the hospital and, ultimately, required to undergo a caesarian section
against her will.”41 Finally, in dissent, Judge Berger concluded that even though “the trial judge
applied the wrong legal standard,” the case was moot.42
This appellate decision was a victory. And because of that, it would be easy to conclude
that the case should not be included in this volume. But Sawicki’s concurrence perfectly highlights
the omissions that speak loudly even in cases where women successfully assert their rights—the
exclusion of women’s stories, the undervaluing of their interests, the creation or exaggeration of
fetal-maternal conflicts, and the failure to recognize the impact of gender bias. I explore below
how Sawicki’s concurrence fills in these gaps and models how judges can better promote feminist
ideals.
III.

Feminist Judgment

The main contribution of Sawicki’s concurrence is to highlight the various evidentiary
failures of the trial court. This addition is vital. The record lacks any evidence corroborating Dr.
Bures-Forsthoefel’s assertion that the compelled treatment would help Ms. Burton’s child; it also
fails entirely to consider Ms. Burton’s reasons for refusal or whether the compelled treatment
would be non-invasive or pose low risks to her. Instead, the trial court accepted as fact the medical
opinion of one doctor and seemed to ignore Ms. Burton completely. Though the appellate opinion
corrects the trial court’s legal errors, it fails to discuss these important factual omissions or consider
whether the evidence was sufficiently supported by “competent, substantial evidence.”43
36

Id.
Id.
38
Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla.1990)).
39
Id. (Van Nortwick, J., concurring) (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981)).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 267.
42
Id. at 267-68.
43
Id. at 2-4.
37
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a.

Lack of Evidence that the Compelled Treatment Would Benefit Ms. Burton’s Child

First, Sawicki’s concurrence notes that there is no evidence or testimony corroborating Dr.
Bures-Forsthoefel’s medical opinion that bed rest and other medical interventions were in the best
interests of Ms. Burton’s child.44 This is troubling for many reasons. For one, medical advice is
inherently fallible. Sawicki explains in her concurrence that nearly a third of court ordered
interventions against pregnant women are futile or harmful in retrospect.45 This case falls within
that category. Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel ordered inpatient bed rest at great personal cost to Ms. Burton
even though it is ineffective at treating PPROM, from which Ms. Burton suffered, and is associated
with serious medical risks.46 Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel also completed a caesarian section without Ms.
Burton’s consent for a child that had already died in utero, further jeopardizing Ms. Burton’s health
and future fertility with no corresponding benefit to her child.47 As the medical literature suggested,
Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel’s aggressive and rights-depriving approach was not guaranteed (or even
more likely than not) to save Ms. Burton’s child.
Without question, Ms. Burton could have opted to pursue this course of treatment had she
desired, but it is outrageous that she was forced to receive risky and futile care against her will.
Had the court required any corroborating evidence or permitted Ms. Burton to pursue a second
medical opinion, it could have realized that the accepted medical standard of care in this situation
is deference to parental choice and that Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel’s recommendations were likely
grounded in an ideological objection to Ms. Burton’s decision. Anti-choice doctors can bring their
belief that fetal life should be protected at all costs into their medical judgments even outside of
the abortion context.48
It is worth noting that the trial court’s Order Authorizing Medical Treatment may not have
been justified even under the BIC standard that the court incorrectly utilized. Under common law
and the U.S. Constitution, parents are given broad authority to make healthcare decisions for their
children.49 These parental rights can be overridden in certain cases where the parental choice is
clearly not in the child’s best interest—for instance, if parents refuse a life-saving blood transfusion
for their child on religious grounds.50 But when there is no obviously correct medical decision to
be made for the child, courts often defer to parental choice even if it involves refusing medical

44

Sawicki Concurrence at 4-5.
Id.
46
See supra notes 11-12.
47
ACLU Brief at 2.
48
Jeffrey Blustein & Alan R. Fleischman, The Pro-Life Maternal-Fetal Medicine Physician A Problem of Integrity,
25 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 22, 23-24 (1995) (“Pro-life does not just mean anti-abortion, of course, and a pro-life
position can be expected to have implications for physician conduct beyond those relating to abortion. For example,
in cases involving a conflict between the interests of the expectant mother and those of the unborn child, a pro-life
physician may support interventions to protect the fetus that a pro-choice physician would oppose.”).
49
See e.g., In Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115
(Del. 1991) (“Parental authority to make fundamental decisions for minor children is also a recognized common law
principle”).
50
See e.g., Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1115-17.
45
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care that might be beneficial. 51 For instance, in Newmark v. Williams, the Supreme Court of
Delaware allowed parents to refuse treatment for their child with cancer because even with
aggressive medical treatment, the child only had a 40% chance of survival and the treatment would
have caused intense suffering.52 Ms. Burton’s child faced similar odds. Thus, even under this lower
standard, the trial court may have errored in ordering treatment over Ms. Burton’s objection.
b.

Lack of Evidence that the Compelled Treatment Would Not Harm Ms. Burton

Second, Sawicki’s concurrence points out that there is no evidence in the record about how
this treatment would have affected Ms. Burton—the actual recipient of the treatment.53 Though
this evidence is always essential, it is especially important to consider it here given the possibility
that any coerced care would have been futile for her child. Can the state ever prove the fetus’s
interests outweigh the mother’s when the child is more likely than not to die regardless of the care
she or he receives? As Sawicki notes, bed rest and caesarian sections carry serious risks, including
muscle and weight loss, bone turnover, depression and anxiety, infection, hemorrhage, and death.54
Here, the risks to Ms. Burton carried no benefit to either Ms. Burton or her child. But even had the
bedrest or surgical delivery been in the fetus’s best interest based on competent medical evidence,
a pregnant woman’s medical interests must be considered alongside her child’s. After all, it is only
when the treatment “poses an insignificant or no health risk to the woman . . . and would clearly
prevent substantial and irreversible harm to her fetus” that compelled medical treatment should
even be considered. 55 By excluding all evidence of the risks to Ms. Burton, the trial court
dehumanized her and rendered her nothing more than a vessel.56
Unfortunately, even when doctors and courts consider the risks to the pregnant woman
along with the risks to her child, they often exaggerate the risks to the child and undercount the
risks to the woman.57 This disparate risk valuation is based on the assumption that women should
be self-sacrificing—i.e., that they should bear large risks even for a small chance of benefit for
their child.58 “[I]n dismissing the risks to the mother, the doctor treats her needs as less important
than those of her child. She is supposed to be willing to sacrifice her well-being—even to risk
death—for the health of her fetus.”59 When women fail to abide by this assumption, women are

See e.g., Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1119. (“No American court, even in the most egregious case, has ever authorized
the State to remove a child from the loving, nurturing care of his parents and subject him, over parental objection, to
an invasive regimen of treatment which offered, as Dr. Meek defined the term, only a forty percent chance of
‘survival.’”).
52
Id.
53
Sawicki Concurrence at 4-6.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 5 (quoting the American Medical Association).
56
See e.g., April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women for the Benefit of
Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 148 (2007) (“Detention and commitment for the benefit of fetal
health reduces pregnant women from citizens to “fetal containers” and “maternal environments.”).
57
See e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L. J 492, 562 (1993).
58
Id. at 563 (“The physician's conclusory decision that the indeterminate risk of infection in the newborn outweighs
the doubling in the risk of death to the mother (as well as the additional risk of complications to both) reveals an
underlying assumption (perhaps unconscious) that women both are and should be self-sacrificing.”).
59
Id.
51
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often pegged as bad mothers in need of correction.60 But forcing women to be self-sacrificial is
anomalous in the American legal tradition, where courts have historically opined that individuals
have no legal obligation to save the lives of others.61 And of course, there is nothing inherently
irrational or wrong about parents neutrally balancing competing risks between the mother and fetus
or even prioritizing the health of the mother, who is a fully-formed person with unequivocal moral
value.
c.

Refusal to Consider Ms. Burton’s Non-Medical Interests

Finally, Sawicki highlights that there is no evidence of Ms. Burton’s motives for refusing
treatment.62 We know at a minimum that Ms. Burton had two children at home for whom she was
responsible. Understandably, she did not want to be separated from them, especially for an
indeterminate amount of time. Though the trial court painted Ms. Burton as a bad mother for
refusing treatment that might save her baby, she was in all likelihood acting out of love and care
for her two living children as any good mother would. The trial court paradoxically demanded that
Ms. Burton entirely ignore the needs of her two kids, but also be willing to sacrifice everything for
her fetus. It would have been reasonable for Ms. Burton to prioritize the needs of her living children,
especially given that the forced separation and bed rest were never likely to save her baby.
It is also possible that Ms. Burton’s refusal of care was at least partially related to her
child’s poor prognosis. Even if that were the case, it would not make Ms. Burton a bad mother to
the child inside of her. Many women find it more compassionate to save their child from suffering
in this world than to force the child to endure months of pain that might nevertheless end in death.63
Sometimes, “a blanket and an embrace is the highest quality care [mothers] can give [their]
bab[ies].”64 The optimal response in this situation is not determined by objective medical facts
alone, but by the parents’ values. Joseph Goldstein has argued that “no one can be presumed to be
in a better position, and thus better equipped, than a child's parents to decide what course to pursue
if the medical experts cannot agree or, assuming their agreement, if there is no general agreement
in society that the outcome of treatment is clearly preferred to the outcome of no treatment.”65
There is no “right” answer for Ms. Burton, which is why all relevant professional organizations

Id. at 565 (“This delegation [to doctors] is the final critical step in a process that, through medical and legal
discourse, defines mothers as "good" or "bad" depending on whether or not they accept ‘medically necessary’
procedures.”); April L. Cherry, Roe's Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women and
Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 740 (2004) (“Only when pregnant women make
altruistic choices on behalf of their fetuses, are their choices assured of state protection. When pregnant women wish
to make themselves, their lives, their desires, or their values primary, courts have instead restricted women's
autonomy by compelling unwanted, nonconsensual treatment on behalf of the fetus.”).
61
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recognize that parents are entitled to make the choice that they feel is best for their child.66 It might
not have been the decision that Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel would make if she were unlucky enough to
face the same experience, but she was never the relevant decision maker.
By ignoring Ms. Burton’s motives entirely, the court whitewashed her out of her own
child’s death, as if Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel cared more about her child than she did. But only Ms.
Burton, not the doctor or the judge, would have to deal with the anxiety of watching her child
experience pain and fight for life. Only Ms. Burton would have to suffer for months while her
child was in the NICU, not knowing if she would ever take her baby home. Only Ms. Burton would
have to nurse the child if she or he survived with serious disabilities. And only Ms. Burton would
ultimately mourn her child’s death. Other than her refusal to unquestionably accept Dr. BuresForsthoefel’s treatment plan—a decision that was medically correct in hindsight—there was no
reason to suspect Ms. Burton was anything but a loving mother. It is therefore anomalous that the
trial court concluded that Dr. Bures-Forsthoelfel was more credibly acting in the child’s best
interests than the child’s mother.
As Sawicki’s concurrence points out, the trial court made a common mistake: the false
assumption that Ms. Burton’s interests conflicted with those of her child. 67 While this is the
dominate paradigm in the case of abortion, there is no reason to see the mother and child’s interests
as conflicting in desired pregnancies. Parents want what is best for their children—in fact, the
Supreme Court recognizes a “presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests”—
but parents may disagree with their doctors on what that is.68 There is nothing innately wrong with
a person challenging their physician’s recommendations, seeking a second opinion, or pursing a
different treatment plan. As discussed above, medical advice is fallible, and patients (not their
doctors) are the only people who must live with the effects of their medical decisions. Ms. Burton
did not agree with Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel’s advice. This wasn’t necessarily because of any conflict
between her interests in the child’s interests, but because she decided that a different approach was
in the best interest of herself and her child.69 The court should have acknowledged this.
IV.

Discussion

Sawicki’s concurrence clearly documents why trial courts should not rely on the testimony
of one physician to compel treatment. It is not enough for appellate courts to correct a trial court’s
inaccurate legal standards, they must also police whether lower courts are meeting a sufficiency
of the evidence standard. The correct legal standard will do little to protect women in future
situations if courts routinely defer to the opinion of one doctor who may greatly exaggerate the
possible benefits to the potential child and undercount the risks to the woman. Doctors motivated
by their personal ideology do this with regularity and judges often accept their findings without
question.70 Though courts typically see doctors as “neutral arbiters,” Michelle Oberman has argued
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that doctors are often the ones generating the conflict. 71 She suggests that the conflict is not
between the women and the fetus, but between the woman and her doctor.72 And by definition, the
doctor cannot be an impartial party when he or she instigated the very action by contacting the
state. 73 Sawicki’s concurrence—had it been included with the original opinion—would have
provided more protection to Floridan women under the care of overzealous doctors by urging trial
courts to demand corroborating medical testimony and evidence before reaching their findings of
fact.
These evidentiary failures are problematic for their own sake, but also for the stereotypes
they promote. Nancy Ehrenreich has argued that when courts unquestioningly accept medical
judgments “as ‘truth’ and reject[] alternative approaches as ridiculous,” they “draw the inevitable
conclusion that women who resist doctors’ orders are irresponsible, hysterical, and/or dangerous”74
Though law tends to defer to medicine as an objective truth, the history of birth “has highlighted
the fact that medicine is a social construct.”75 Women should not be labeled as bad mothers simply
for challenging the recommendations of a doctor—recommendations that may very well be wrong
or not in accordance with their own values and preferences. Courts can fight this stereotype by
forcing doctors to corroborate their recommendations instead of paternalistically assuming a
doctor knows what is better for a woman and her child than the woman does. At the very least,
courts should permit patients the small grace of a second opinion to demonstrate that their decision
fits within a range of reasonable options.
Sawicki’s concurrence does an excellent job of demonstrating that these crucial omissions
are not just mistakes, but the result of systemic marginalization of women and gender bias in the
courts.76 Of course, this marginalization and bias affects poor women and women of color to a
much greater degree than white women.77 One study found that eighty-one percent of court ordered
interventions against pregnant women involved women of color. 78 By highlighting the various
ways that gender bias impacts women in the legal system, Sawicki calls on trial courts to recognize
and correct their sexism. It might not impact the most ideological judges, but would certainly
provide helpful language to trial court judges who may be suspicious of physician
recommendations or eager to correct mistakes of the past. Overall, Sawicki’s concurrence adds
much needed feminist perspective and evidentiary bite to the Burton opinion.
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